Grok Bot Access
How Grok Bot reaches the homelab. Checked 2026-11-18, read-only. The bot's own ssh config
is not on this desktop, so the alias lines below are the intended client config, and the allow-list is
what the jump host actually enforces. No key material is written here. Neither assistant makes a change
without my approval.
Path
Grok Bot is off the LAN. Its SSH aliases pve, docker, and ha
use ProxyJump through grokbot@homelab-tailscale.
homelab-tailscale is the Proxmox Tailscale container. See [[ProxMox]].
The key file name is ~/.ssh/grokbot_homelab. The jump host has one key in /home/grokbot/.ssh/authorized_keys.
What that user can do
The shell is /usr/sbin/nologin. There is no sudoers entry. sshd itself
allows TCP forwarding. The key options are what limit it: restrict, port-forwarding, and permitopen to port 22 only. The hosts are Proxmox (pve), the Docker VM (docker), Home Assistant (ha), and UniFi OS. An
unifi alias was not part of the intended client config.
restrict turns off a pty, agent forwarding, and the other extras. port-forwarding turns forwarding back on, and permitopen is the whole list.
This is not the subnet route
The Tailscale container still advertises one subnet route, and that route is what my own machines use off the LAN. They then SSH as they do on the LAN, with the [[Yubikey: 2-factor authentication (U2F, OATH and OTP) and SSH]]. Grok Bot does not get that route. Its key cannot open the rest of the LAN, and it cannot open anything except port 22 on those four hosts.
Revoke
Delete /home/grokbot/.ssh/authorized_keys on the Tailscale container. That removes the
only key. The user account can stay.
Assistants
Homelab owns Proxmox, and a weekly read-only update check on Sundays. Cloud Infrastructure owns the three Cloudflare accounts: Podval, OpenTorah, and CognoMath. See [[Cloud Infrastructure]] and [[Domains]]. Neither makes changes without my approval.